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Implementing a United Nations Security
Council Resolution: The President's
Power to Use Force Without the
Authorization of Congress
By MATrHEW D. BERGER*
Member of the Class of 1992
I. INTRODUCTION
After Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the United Nations
became the focus of a successful international effort to expel Iraqi forces
from Kuwait. The end of the Cold War and the new spirit of coopera-
tion between the United States and the Soviet Union had revitalized the
United Nations as an instrument of international peace and security. To
some degree, agreement replaced stalemate in the Security Council, and
with agreement came political and military support from member na-
tions. Thus, for the first time since the Korean War, the United Nations
was willing and able to fulfill its avowed purpose and take "effective col-
lective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,
and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace" in order to "maintain international peace and security."'
Most nations have expressed strong support for the United Nations
new role. In the United States, both the Republican President and the
Democratic Congress heralded the resurgence of the United Nations as
the beginning of a new world order and vowed to use the organization in
the future. In the rush to celebrate the victory in the Gulf War, however,
many in the United States Government and the American press have
forgotten difficult questions raised by war and the United Nations new
role.
Perhaps the most troublesome issue arose after the Security Council
passed Resolution 6782 on November 29, 1990. Resolution 678 de-
* B.A., Cornell University, 1987. The author wishes to dedicate this Note to the mem-
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1. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, I.
2. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. SIRES/678 (1990), to be reprinted in U.N. SCOR. 45th
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manded that Iraq comply with Resolution 660,1 which had condemned
the invasion, demanded an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of
Iraqi forces, and called upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediate negoti-
ations to resolve their disputes. More importantly, Resolution 678 au-
thorized all member states of the United Nations to use "all necessary
means" to implement Resolution 660 unless Iraqi forces withdrew from
Kuwait before January 15, 199 . Shortly after the passage of Resolution
678, President Bush claimed that he had the constitutional authority to
use military force to implement the Resolution without congressional au-
thorization.5 Although Congress ultimately authorized the use of mili-
tary force,6 the questions raised by the President's claim remain
Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1990 (adopted 12-2, with Cuba and
Yemen against and China abstaining, on November 29, 1990).
3. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990), to be reprinted in U.N. SCOR, 45th
Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1990 (adopted 14-0, with Yemen not
participating, on August 2, 1990). The Security Council passed Resolution 660 on August 2,
1990, the day of the invasion.
4. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 2.
5. Excerpts" The Great Debate on War Powers, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 21, 1990, at 26 [herein-
after The Great Debate].
6. Text of Congressional Joint Resolution on Use of Force, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 14, 1991, at
A11. The full text of the resolution is as follows:
To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations
Security Council Resolution 678.
WHEREAS the Government of Iraq without provocation invaded and occupied
the territory of Kuwait on August 2, 1990; and
WHEREAS both the House of Representatives (in H.J. Res. 658 of the 101st
Congress) and the Senate (in S. Con. Res. 147 of the 101st Congress) have con-
demned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and declared their support for international action
to reverse Iraq's aggression; and
WHEREAS, Iraq's conventional, chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and
ballistic missile programs and its demonstrated willingness to use weapons of mass
destruction pose a grave threat to world peace; and
WHEREAS the international community has demanded that Iraq withdraw un-
conditionally and immediately from Kuwait and that Kuwait's independence and
legitimate government be restored; and
WHEREAS the U.N. Security Council repeatedly affirmed the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense in response to the armed attack by Iraq against
Kuwait in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter; and
WHEREAS, in the absence of full compliance by Iraq with its resolutions, the
U.N. Security Council in Resolution 678 has authorized mcmbers states of the
United Nations to use all necessary means, after January 15, 1991, to uphold and
implement all relevant Security Council resolutions and to restore international
peace and security in the area; and
WHEREAS Iraq has persisted in its illegal occupation of, and brutal aggression
against Kuwait; Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of Me United States of
America in Congress assembled,
Section 1.
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unanswered. If accepted, his claim creates a new justification for the
President's use of force without congressional authorization and expands
Presidential control over the war power at the expense of Congress'
authority.
Implicit in the President's claim is the assumption either that he
already had the constitutional authority to use military force without
congressional authorization, or that the Security Council Resolutions
gave him such constitutional authority. Three distinct theories support
the President's claim:7 The first holds that the President must implement
a Security Council resolution because of his constitutional duty to take
care that the laws of the United States be faithfully executed; the second
that the President may implement a Security Council resolution under
his own authority, either because the Constitution gives him the power to
initiate war or because military action to implement a Security Council
SHORT TITLE
This joint resolution may be cited as the "Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against Iraq Resolution."
Section 2.
AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF U.S. ARMED FORCES
(a) AUTHORIZATION. - The President is authorized, subject to subsection
(b), to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council
Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council Reso-
lutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677.
(b) REQUIREMENT FOR DETERMINATION THAT USE OF MILI-
TARY FORCE IS NECESSARY. -
Before exercising the authority granted in subsection (a), the President shall
make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro
tempore of the Senate his determination that -
(1) the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful
means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the United Nations Security Council reso-
lutions cited in subsection (a); and
(2) that those efforts have not been and would not be successful in obtaining
such compliance.
(c) WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS. -
(1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION. - Consistent with sec-
tion 8(a) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is
intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section
5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.
(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS. - Nothing in this
resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.
Section 3.
REPORTS TO CONGRESS
At least once every 60 days, the President shall submit to the Congress a sum-
mary on the status of efforts to obtain compliance by Iraq with the resolutions
adopted by the United Nations Security Council in response to Iraq's aggression.
7. Capitol Hill Hearing about the Middle-East, Hearing of Federation offAterican Scien-
tists (Jan. 7, 1991) in Federal News Service, Jan. 7, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Fednew File [hereinafter Fed of Am. Sci].
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resolution does not constitute war within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion; the third that the President may use force to implement a Security
Council resolution because Congress delegated the power to declare war
to the President when it ratified the United Nations Charter.
This Note examines the President's claim that he had the constitu-
tional authority to use military force to implement Resolution 678 with-
out congressional authorization and concludes that the President's claim
has no merit. More specifically, this Note examines the three theories
described above and finds that they fail to support the President's claim.
The first theory fails because there was no obligation for the President to
take care to faithfully execute Resolution 678. The Security Council au-
thorized, but did not obligate, the United States to use all necessary
means (and not necessarily military force) to implement Resolution 678.
Further, the Security Council has no authority to obligate the United
States to use military force because the United States has never signed a
special agreement under Article 43 of the U.N. Charter. The second the-
ory fails because the conflict in the Persian Gulf was a war within the
meaning of the Constitution and only Congress has the constitutional
power to declare war. Even assuming that the conflict in the Persian
Gulf was not a war within the meaning of the Constitution, the President
may not contravene the will of Congress as it has been expressed in the
War Powers Resolution. Finally, while the entire Congress may delegate
the power to declare war under certain circumstances, the Senate alone
cannot do so through the treaty process. The whole Congress must par-
ticipate in the delegation of an enumerated power. In fact, Congress did
delegate the power to declare war to the President by passing the United
Nations Participation Act. The Act requires, however, that the Presi-
dent negotiate a special agreement with the Security Council, the whole
Congress consent to such agreement, and the President ratify it. Since
this has not happened, the President does not have the power to declare
war based on the third theory.
II. THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY
Some commentators argue that Resolution 678 was a legal obliga-
tion of the United States and that, therefore, the President had to imple-
ment it because of his constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws of
the United States. This argument is based upon article II, section 3 of
the Constitution, which requires that the President "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed." 8 As described in the Supremacy Clause of
8. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
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the Constitution, the term "Laws" includes treaties as well as acts of
Congress: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land . . ."I The Supreme Court, in interpreting the
Supremacy Clause, has stated: "By the Constitution a treaty is placed
on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legisla-
tion. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the
land ... ."1O Therefore, it is well established that the President must
enforce treaties entered into by the United States in the same way as the
Constitution and other federal laws.
The United Nations Charter is a treaty consented to by the Senate,
ratified by the President," and implemented by the full Congress. 2
Thus, it is the supreme law of the land and the President must take care
that the Charter be faithfully executed. 3 By extension, the President
also must enforce any obligations arising under the Charter, including
obligations which take the form of Security Council resolutions.
The Constitution, however, does not require the President to exe-
cute Security Council resolutions or Charter provisions that do not obli-
gate, but merely authorize or recommend. Further, the Constitution
prohibits the President from executing Security Council resolutions or
Charter provisions which are inconsistent with the Constitution. 4
Therefore, the threshold question is whether Resolution 678 obli-
gated the President to use military force to expel Iraqi forces from Ku-
wait. Assuming that the Security Council obligated member states to use
military force, a further question is whether the Security Council had the
authority under the United Nations Charter to so obligate the President.
A careful reading of both Resolution 678 and the United Nations Char-
ter demonstrates that the Security Council did not and could not obligate
the President to use military force. Therefore, the Constitution did not
require the President to faithfully execute Resolution 678.
9. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
10. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
11. United Nations Charter, June 26, 1945, 59 StaL 1031, T.S. No. 993.
12. United Nations Participation Act of 1945, ch. 583, 59 Stat. 619 (codified as amended
at 22 U.S.C. §§ 287-287e (1964)).
13. See Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81
HARV. L. REv. 1771, 1776 (1968) [hereinafter Power to Commit Forces]. ("Since international
law as well as statutes and treaties had long been considered part of the 'laws' to which the
'faithfully executed' clause refers any interests evidenced by those laws became a potential
subject for presidential protection by force.").
14. See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) (treaty not construed to "extend so far
as to authorize what the Constitution forbids ").
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A. Obligations Arising Under Security Council Resolution 678
The language of Resolution 678 clearly indicates that the Security
Council did not intend to obligate member nations. Resolution 678 in
pertinent part:
AUTHORIZES member states cooperating with the Government of
Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before Jan. 15, 1991, fully implements, as set
forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all neces-
sary means to uphold and implement the Security Council Resolution
660 and all subsequent relevant Resolutions and to restore interna-
tional peace and security in the area .... 15
Rather than "ordering" or "calling upon" member nations to take ac-
tion, Resolution 678 merely "authorizes" action.1 6 Furthermore, Reso-
lution 678 does not require member nations to use military force, but
only authorizes "all necessary means."
15. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 2. The full text of Resolution 678 is as follows:
THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
RECALLING AND REAFFIRMING its Resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990),
662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990), 669 (1990), 670 (1990),
674 (1990) and 677 (1990),
NOTING that, despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq refuses to com-
ply with its obligation to implement Resolution 660 (1990) and subsequent resolu-
tions, in flagrant contempt of the Council,
MINDFUL of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of the United
Nations for the maintenance and preservation of international peace and security,
DETERMINED to secure full compliance with its decisions,
ACTING under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. DEMANDS that Iraq comply fully with Resolution 660 (1990) and all
subsequent relevant resolutions and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to
allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of good will, to do so
2. AUTHORIZES member states cooperating with the Government of Ku-
wait, unless Iraq on or before Jan. 15, 1991, fully implements, as set forth in para-
graph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and
implement the Security Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant Resolu-
tions and to restore international peace and security in the area
3. REQUESTS all states to provide appropriate support for the actions under-
taken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of this resolution and
4. REQUESTS the states concerned to keep the Council regularly informed on
the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this resolution
5. DECIDES to remain seized of the matter.
16. Professor Louis Henkin of Columbia Law School told the Senate Judiciary Committee
on January 8, 1991, that: "[W]hatever the power of the Security Council in theory, in fact it
has not purported to order states to use force. In Korea, and again now in Iraq, it recom-
mended or authorized military action; it did not purport to create on member states to do so."
The Great Debate, supra note 5. See also William W. Van Alstyne, Letting Slip the Dogs of
War, WASH. PosT, Dec. 23, 1990, at C7; David J. Scheffer, Perspective on the United Nations:
Bush Wins the Right to Look for Trouble: What the Resolution Leaves Unsaid Allows the
Decision to Use Force to Be Directed from the Pentagon, L.A. TiMs;, Nov. 30, 1990, at B7,
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Thus, the Security Council left the decision of whether to take ac-
tion and what action to take to each member nation. The option of war
in support of Resolution 678 was a "discretionary national decision,"
subject to the constitutional processes of each member nation. 17 Under
the constitutional processes of the United States, Congress decides
whether the United States will go to war. Therefore, the argument that
the Constitution required the President to faithfully execute Resolution
678 because it is an obligation of the United States fails.
B. Obligations Arising Under the United Nations Charter
Even assuming that the Security Council intended to obligate mem-
ber nations of the United Nations to use military force to expel Iraqi
forces from Kuwait, the question still remains whether the Security
Council had the authority under the United Nations Charter to so obli-
gate member nations.
Article 39 of the U.N. Charter requires that the Security Council
first "determine the existence of any threat to the peace,. . . or act of
aggression" and then "make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security.""8 Commentators generally in-
terpret this article to mean that the Security Council has "unrestricted
discretion to determine whether a threat to the peace, a breach of the
peace or an act of aggression [has] in fact occurred." 9 Once the Security
Council has made such a finding, it can either make recommendations or
decide to take measures under Articles 41 and 42. The import of the
word "decide" in Article 39 is that the Security Council may obligate
member nations to take measures under Articles 41 and 42.20
Therefore, the Security Council appears to have the authority to
bind member nations both as to its characterization of "a threat to the
17. Scheffer, supra note 16. Professor William W. Van Alstyne of Duke University Law
School stated that:
Whether those means are to be war rather than continuation of the collective eco-
nomic blockade, or any other form of sanction, or nothing at all, is left to each state
to decide. Engaging American armed forces in war, therefore, is an issue for the
constitutional processes of the United States and does not come from the United
Nations at all.
Van Alstyne, supra note 16.
18. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
19. NORMAN BENTWICH & ANDREW MARTIN, A COMMENTARY ON THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 88 (2d ed. 1969); see also LELAND GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO,
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DoCUMENTS 298-99 (3d ed. 1969).
20. BENTWICH & MARTIN, supra note 19, at 90; GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 19,
at 300.
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peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression" and as to the ac-
tions it decides are necessary. Article 25 of the Charter bolsters this in-
terpretation: "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the
present Charter. "21
The only limitation on the Security Council's power to bind member
states is the requirement that any measure taken by the Security Council
be "in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore inter-
national peace and security."22 Under Article 41, the Security Council
"may call upon the Members of the United Nations" to apply economic
and diplomatic sanctions.23 If the Security Council considers such sanc-
tions inadequate, Article 42 authorizes it to "take such action by air, sea,
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security[,]" including "demonstrations, blockade, and other
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Na-
tions.' '2 4 Thus, Article 42 authorizes the Security Council to use military
forces composed of units from member states to maintain or restore in-
ternational peace and security.
It appears that Articles 39 and 42 could be read together to em-
power the Security Council to require contributions of military forces
from member nations when necessary. However, Article 43 specifies the
manner in which the Security Council can raise those forces. 21 It re-
quires member nations to "undertake to make available to the Security
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agree-
ments, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of pas-
sage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and
security."' 26 The agreements "shall govern the numbers and types of
forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of
the facilities and assistance to be provided., 27 Further, such agreements
shall be between the Security Council and the member nations and "sub-
21. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
22. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
23. U.N. CHARTER art. 41. Article 41 provides that:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force
are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of
the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
24. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
25. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 19, at 316.
26. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, 1.
27. Id. t 2.
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ject to ratification by the signatory states. ' 28
Thus, Article 43 conditions the Security Council's authority to re-
quire troops from member nations upon the existence of a special agree-
ment between the Security Council and the same member nations. In
other words, the Security Council has no power to obligate member na-
tions to provide military forces to implement Security Council decisions
unless those member nations expressly agreed to be so obligated.29
Further, Article 43 requires that the member nations ratify any
agreement "in accordance with their respective constitutional pro-
cesses." 30 Thus, any special agreement between the Security Council and
the United States must be approved by the Senate, ratified by the Presi-
dent, and implemented by the full Congress before being valid. Only
then may the Security Council obligate the United States to provide mili-
tary forces to implement a Security Council resolution, and then only to
the extent specified in the special agreement. No member nation has ever
concluded a special agreement with the Security Council pursuant to Ar-
ticle 43.31 Accordingly, the Security Council cannot obligate the United
States or any other member nation to provide military forces to imple-
ment Security Council decisions.
The drafters of the Charter recognized that some time might pass
before the Security Council concluded any special agreements and at-
tempted to provide an interim method for maintaining or restoring inter-
national peace and security.32 Thus, Article 106 provides that the parties
to the Four-Nation Declaration33 and France
shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of the Declara-
tion, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other
members of the United Nations "with a view to such joint action on
28. Id 3.
29. D.W. BowErr, UNITED NATIONS FORCES 277 (1964). See also FINN SEYERSTED,
UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN THE LAW OF PEACE AND WAR 161-62 (1966); REVIEW OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: COMPILATION OF STAFF STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE USE OF
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, S. Doc. No. 164, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 195 (1955); BENTWICH & MARTIN, supra
note 19, at 97-98. In addition, even if a member nation signs a special agreement, "no Member
of the Organization is obligated under Article 42 to employ 'armed forces, assistance, and
facilities' in excess of those specifically provided for in the 'special agreement or agreements'
mentioned in Article 43." GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 19, at 316.
30. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, 3.
31. Michael J. Glennon, The UN Security Council Can't Substitute for Congress, CH RLS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 20, 1990, at 19.
32. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 19, at 629.
33. The United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China were signato-
ries to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed in Moscow on October 30, 1943. GOODRICH &
HAMBRO, supra note 19, at 629 n.2.
1991]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of
maintaining international peace and security."
34
The Security Council cannot legally bind any member nation under
Article 106 because it only requires that the United States, the United
Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, and France "consult." Article 106
does not require any action by those nations. Furthermore, it directs
these five nations to act, not in support of the Security Council, but in
place of the Security Council, under their own authority and collective
judgment. Therefore, Article 106 does not bind the United States nor
justify the President's use of force without congressional authorization.
Another provision of the Charter which the President has cited to
support his use of military force to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait with-
out the Congress' consent is Article 51.3 Article 51 preserves a member
nation's inherent right of individual and collective self-defense until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security.36 Secretary of State James Baker claimed, during a
hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that a request
from the legitimate government of Kuwait empowered the President to
use military force to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait under Article 51.
37
This claim fails for several reasons. First, nothing in Article 51 obligates
the United States to aid Kuwait. It only says that a member nation may
aid another member nation under attack. Second and more importantly,
this right to aid another member nation under attack without interfer-
ence from the Charter exists only "until the Security Council has taken
34. U.N. CHARTER art. 106. Article 5 of the Four-Nation Declaration declared as
follows:
That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the rc-
establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security,
they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other Members of
the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.
Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, Moscow, October30, 1943, 9 DEP'T ST. BULL.
308 (1943), reprinted in GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 19, at 629.
35. See Kathryn S. Elliott, Note, The Right of Self Defense in the United Nations Charter
and the New World Order, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 55 (1991).
36. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter declares that:
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of selr-defense shall be im-
mediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the au-
thority of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
37. Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: The Persian Gulf Crisis - state-
ment of Secretary of State James Baker 111, Federal News Service, Oct. 17, 1990, available In
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File, at *70.
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the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." '38
When the Security Council passed Resolution 660 on August 2, 1990,
condemning the invasion of Kuwait and demanding that Iraq withdraw
immediately,3 9 any right the United States had under Article 51 to aid
Kuwait disappeared.4 '
In sum, even if the Security Council had intended to obligate mem-
ber nations to use force to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, it would have
had no legal authority to do so under the United Nations Charter. While
the Security Council can decide to use military force under Article 39
and then implement that decision under Article 42, it cannot require
member nations to provide military forces unless those nations have pre-
viously bound themselves in a special agreement ratified according to
their constitutional processes. Since no member nation has ever con-
cluded a special agreement, 41 the Security Council has no authority to
require member nations to provide military forces. A request to use mili-
tary force in the absence of any special agreement is not legally binding.
Therefore, the United States may honor or reject that request through
the normal constitutional processes for deciding whether to go to war-a
vote of Congress.42 Since the Constitution only requires the President to
enforce binding obligations, and Resolution 678 was not such an obliga-
tion, the President had no duty to faithfully execute it.
I. THE PRESIDENT'S POWER TO ORDER THE USE
OF FORCE WITHOUT CONGRESSIONAL
AUTHORIZATION
The President and his supporters have argued that the President has
the power to use military force to implement Resolution 678 without the
consent of Congress.4 3 They make two arguments. First, they argue that
the President has the power to initiate hostilities, even if they amount to
war. In the alternative, they concede that the President does not have
the power to initiate hostilities which amount to war, but argue that he
can initiate hostilities of a more limited nature, such as a "police action"
to implement a Security Council resolution.
The first argument fails because the plain meaning of the text, his-
38. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
39. S.C. Res. 660, supra note 3.
40. See BENTWICH & MARTIN, supra note 19, at 107. See also Anthony Lewis, Abroad at
Home7 The Logic of War, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 12, 1990, at A19.
41. Glennon, supra note 31.
42. See Scheffer, supra note 16; Van Alstyne, supra note 16.
43. The Great Debate, supra note 5. See Fed. ofAm. Sci, supra note 7.
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tory of the drafting, and judicial interpretation of the Constitution all
declare that only Congress has the power to begin a war. The second
argument fails as well because the type and magnitude of force contem-
plated by the President to implement Resolution 678 clearly constituted
war within the meaning of the Constitution. Even if one assumes that
such use of force did not constitute war, however, the President's consti-
tutional authority to take action which would threaten war is severely
limited when Congress has prohibited such action. Since Congress ex-
pressly regulated, in the War Powers Resolution, any use of force by the
President, which might threaten war, the President does not have the
constitutional authority to initiate hostilities which might do so.
A. The Conflict in the Gulf: War or Police Action?
Some commentators have argued that any use of military force
under the authority of a Security Council resolution is not a war but a
police action.' They argue that the United Nations Charter, in effect,
outlaws offensive war, and substitutes police action as a means of defend-
ing countries against illegal aggression. 5 Therefore, any use of military
force by President Bush to implement Security Council Resolution 678
would be a police action and not war, no matter how many planes, tanks,
troops, and casualties were involved.
The police action theory derives from Articles 2 and 42. Proponents
argue that Article 2 of the United Nations Charter outlaws offensive
war.4 6 Article 2 requires that all member nations "settle their interna-
tional disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." 47 Further, Article
2 states that member nations "shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Pur-
poses of the United Nations."4 Proponents of the police action theory
further argue that the Charter substitutes police action under Article 42
for war as a means of defending countries against illegal aggression.
49
The police action theory is problematic. It focuses the debate on
superficial semantics and through definitional sleight-of-hand effectively




47. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, 3.
48. Id. 4.
49. Franck, supra note 44.
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nullifies Congress' constitutional power to declare war. The police action
theory assumes that the United Nations Charter can change the defini-
tion of "war" as used in the Constitution-that a treaty can amend the
Constitution. If the Framers of the Constitution had meant to allow for
a definition of "war" different from the definition understood by them,
however, they would have so indicated. Even if one does not accept the
argument that the Constitution should be interpreted according to the
"original intent" of the Framers, one still would be bound by the modem
definition, established by years of common usage and judicial
interpretation.
The original intent of the Framers indicates that "war," as used in
the Constitution, is defined by quantitative and qualitative factorsY° The
assumption that war involves great physical and economic sacrifice and
serious moral and legal consequences is implicit in the Framers' decision
to vest the power to declare war in Congress.51 The Framers recognized,
first, that a war involves a large economic and physical commitment of
the nation's resources; and, second, that a war in which the United States
deliberately takes hostile and deadly action against another nation in-
volves serious moral and legal consequences. 52 Since the American peo-
ple would bear the economic and physical burdens and the moral and
legal consequences, the Framers determined that the people should de-
cide whether the nation would go to war.53 Therefore, only Congress,
the branch of government most representative of the people, should have
the power to commit the nation to war.
The courts also have considered the definition of war. During the
19th century, the Supreme Court took a very broad view of the definition
of war. In Bas v. Tingy, Justice Washington declared that "every conten-
tion by force between two nations, in external matters, under the author-
ity of their respective governments, is not only war, but public war."'
50. Donald E. King & Arthur B. Leavans, Curbing the Dog of War The War Powers
Resolution, 18 HARv. INT'L LJ. 55, 59-60 ('This attempt to define war in terms of magnitude
and political content is supported both by the intent of the Framers of the Constitution and by
the practical realities of representative government."). See also Power to Commit Forces, supra
note 13, at 1774-75.
51. King & Leavans, supra note 50, at 59-60; Power to Commit Forces, supra note 13, at
1774-75 (A definition of war "in the context of the constitutional allocation of power to use
force in foreign relations must be determined with reference to the purpose of the war-declar-
ing clause: To safeguard the United States against unchecked executive decisions to commit
the country to force.").
52. Power to Commit Forces, supra note 13, at 1775.
53. 1,d; see also King & Leavans, supra note 50, at 59-60.
54. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40 (1800) (limited naval engagements between the
United States and France constitute war).
1991]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
In Prize Cases, the Supreme Court stated that "[w]ar has been well de-
fined to be, 'that state in which a nation prosecutes its right by force.' ""
Modem courts have defined war by focusing on the size and dura-
tion of the conflict,5 6 while also recognizing qualitative factors.5 7 The
military court in United States v. Bancroft58 applied both quantitative
and qualitative factors to find that even Korea, the conflict cited most
often as the classic example of a United Nations police action, was "war"
within the meaning of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 59
In October of 1990, a month before the Security Council passed
Resolution 678, the President had decided to launch a large-scale air at-
tack and ground offensive to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait if peaceful
means failed.' By almost any definition of war, a huge offensive-in-
volving thousands of planes, tanks, and artillery pieces; over a million
men and women; and the high probability of thousands of deaths and
tens of thousands of wounded-is a war. Such an offensive clearly would
be war within the meaning of the Constitution. A federal court agreed.
Twelve members of Congress brought an action, Dellums v. Bush, to en-
join the use of military force in the Persian Gulf without congressional
authorization.61 The court declared: "[H]ere the forces involved are of
such magnitude and significance as to present no serious claim that a war
would not ensue if they became engaged in combat." 62 The court stated
that it was "not prepared to read out of the Constitution the clause grant-
55. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666 (1862).
56. Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Orlando v. Laird, 317 F. Supp.
1013, 1018 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
57. King & Leavans, supra note 50, at 58. See DeCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir.
1973).
58. United States v. Bancroft, 35 U.S.C.M.A. 3 (1953).
59. Id at 5. The court declared that:
We believe a finding that this is a time of war, within the meaning of the language of
the Code, is compelled by the very nature of the present conflict; the manner in
which it is carried on; the movement to, and the presence of large numbers of Ameri-
can men and women on, the battlefields of Korea; the casualties involved; the sacri-
fices required; the drafting of recruits to maintain the large number of persons in the
military service; the national emergency legislation enacted and being enacted; the
executive orders promulgated; and the tremendous sums being expended for the ex-
press purpose of keeping our Army, Navy and Air Force in the Korean theatre of
operations.
One commentator examining the legal status of the conflict in Korea also concluded that it was
a war in the classic definition of the word. A. Kenneth Pye, The Legal Status of the Korean
Hostilities, 45 GEO. L.J. 45, 50 (1956).
60. Thomas L. Friedman & Patrick E. Tyler, From the First, US. Resolve to Fight, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 3, 1991, § 1, at 1.
61. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
62. Id. at 1145.
[V/ol. 15
Power to Use Force
ing to the Congress, and to it alone, the authority 'to declare war.' "63 In
sum, such a use of military force did constitute war.
B. The President's War Power
Supporters of the President argue that the President has the power
to initiate war either through his position as Commander in Chief or
implicitly through the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution.
The President's position as Commander in Chief, however, does not give
him the power to initiate war. Furthermore, the aggregate of the Presi-
dent's powers as Commander in Chief, Chief Executive, primary repre-
sentative of the nation in foreign affairs, and as the official responsible for
ensuring that the laws are faithfully executed,64 is not enough to over-
come the constitutional directive that only Congress has the power to
initiate war.65
Although many Presidents have cited the Commander in Chief
clause6 6 in support of their uses of the military, the text and legislative
history of that clause indicate that it authorizes only the "supreme com-
mand and direction of the military and naval forces, as first general and
admiral of the Confederacy . ,. 7 The President's role as the "first
General and Admiral of the Confederacy" is limited to the execution of
policy made by the President in his other roles and by Congress.6 He
has authority to direct the military in time of war and deploy the military
in time of peace, but little else. 69 The real utility of the Commander in
Chief clause is that it gives effect to the President's other powers, such as
the power to control the day-to-day activities of foreign affairs.70
63. Id. at 1146. The court stated:
Given these factual allegations and the legal principles outlined above, the Court has
no hesitation in concluding that an offensive entry into Iraq by several hundred thou-
sand United States servicemen under the conditions described above could be de-
scribed as a "war" within the meaning of Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, of the
Constitution. To put it another way: the Court is not prepared to read out of the
Constitution the clause granting to the Congress, and to it alone, the authority "to
declare war."
64. U.S. CONST. art. II.
65. King & Levans, supra note 50, at 59.
66. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
67. THE FEDERALisr No. 69, at 418 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
68. See Louis HENKiN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTrrTToN 50-51 (1972). See
generally Power to Commit Forces, supra note 13, at 1775, 1785 (the Commander in Chief
provision "ought to play a rather meager role").
69. King & Leavans, supra note 50, at 60.
70. HENKiN, supra note 68 at 54 (It is "plausible to urge that while as Commander-in-
Chief the President's policy initiatives are limited, he can use the troops he commands in
support of his other substantive powers.").
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The Constitution, true to the theory of separation of powers, does
not vest the control of foreign affairs in any one branch. While all three
branches participate in making foreign policy, the President has the most
direct and influential role. The President has the executive power of the
United States,7 the "Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present con-
cur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls . ... "I' Further, the President "shall receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers. . . ,"3 Congress, on the other hand, has a less
direct but still influential role through its legislative powers. It has the
power to "lay and collect ... Duties,74 . . .regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations,7" define and punish maritime crimes and violations of
international law,76 and declare war.77 Finally, the judiciary plays an
indirect and relatively minor role in foreign affairs.78 These few and
sparse provisions have proved little more than a starting point in the
quest to define such a vast power. Instead, events, experience, and expe-
diency have defined the constitutional power over foreign affairs.7 9
In dividing the foreign affairs power, much has been made of then-
Congressman John Marshall's statement that: "The President is the sole
organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative
with foreign nations."8 According to Edward Corwin, a former profes-
sor at Yale, however, all Marshall really meant was that the President is
an instrument of communication with other governments. 8 The Presi-
dent is simply the "mouthpiece of a power of decision that resides
elsewhere."82
The debate in 1793 between two of the Framers of the Constitution,
71. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
72. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
73. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
74. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
75. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
76. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
77. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 11.
78. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Judicial powers found in this clause include cases
affecting ambassadors, admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction and controversies between the
U.S. or its citizens and a foreign nation or citizen.
79. HENKIN, supra note 68, at 37 ("The structure of the government, the facts of national
life, the realities and exigencies of international relations, the practices of diplomacy, have
afforded Presidents unique temptations and unique opportunities to acquire unique powers.").
80. EDWARD CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 207
(1984).
81. Id., at 208.
82. Id.
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James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, played a significant role in
shaping views of whether the President or Congress has primary control
of foreign relations. Madison argued that the power over foreign affairs
meant the power in some situations to choose war or peace. He reasoned
that, since the Constitution gave Congress the power to declare war, it
also must have given Congress control of foreign policy.83 Hamilton, on
the other hand, argued that the power to determine foreign policy is in-
herent in the executive power.8 4 Hamilton thus believed that the Presi-
dent at least had the power to initiate foreign policy even if Congress, in
the exercise of its concurrent and independent powers, refused to imple-
ment it. 5 Hamilton's view, for the most part, has prevailed86 because of
the President's advantages in unity, speed, secrecy, and control of infor-
mation. The Supreme Court ratified the President's assumption of the
foreign affairs power in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.
when it spoke of "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of inter-
national relations-a power which does not require as a basis for its exer-
cise an act of Congress .... "I'
In practice, the broad authority to initiate foreign policy for the
United States, combined with the authority under the executive power to
implement policy and the authority as Commander in Chief to deploy
military forces, has enabled the President to protect foreign policy inter-
ests of the United States with military force even where there is no for-
mal legal basis for such action, such as an obligation arising under a
treaty or statute.88 This power to use force is limited, however. Two
commentators have summed up the President's power to use force by
83. Power to Commit Forces, supra note 13, at 1777. See generally CORWIN, supra note
79, at 210-11.
84. Hamilton argued that the words of limitation in the Constitution's grant of the legisla-
tive power and the lack thereof in the Constitution's grant of the executive power indicated a
general grant of power. Further, the grant of legislative power is emphasized and modified by
the enumerations which follow. Therefore, executive power included the direction of foreign
policy. HENKiN, supra note 67, at 42-43; see also CORWIN, supra note 79, at 209.
85. Power to Commit Forces, supra note 13, at 1777. See generally CORWIN, supra note
79, at 209-10.
86. See generally Ellen Collier, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad,
1798-1989, Cong. Res. Service No. 89-651F (1989).
87. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
88. Power to Commit Forces, supra note 13, at 1777. See also JmiEs GRAFrO RoOGERs,
WORLD POLICING AND THE CONSTITUTION 79 (1945) ("The President ... seem[s] not to have
doubted [his] authority to fight in pursuance of national interests. Congress and the American
public have accepted that view of executive responsibility, duty and scope. The Constitution
has been interpreted by practice. This means of interpretation, even among lawyers, is almost
conclusive.").
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dividing it into three categories:8 9 First, the President has exclusive con-
trol over all peacetime deployments which do not threaten war;90 sec-
ond, only Congress has the power to declare war or to initiate hostilities
amounting to war under the Constitution;91 finally, the President and
Congress have concurrent authority over the use of military force which
threatens war, but does not amount to war under the Constitution.
92
Therefore, through the aggregate of his powers, the President has con-
current authority with Congress over the use of military force in at least
some circumstances.93
C. Congress' War Power
Since the Constitution divides the control over the use of the mili-
tary between the President and Congress, any attempt to determine the
extent of the President's control must include an examination of Con-
gress' powers in this matter. Even if the President may use military force
without congressional authorization in some circumstances, the plain
meaning of the text, the history of the drafting, and interpretation of the
Constitution by the Courts all support the conclusion that only Congress
has the power to declare war or to initiate hostilities amounting to war
under the Constitution.94
The Constitution vests in Congress extensive control over the mili-
tary, including the power to declare war, to raise and support military
forces, and to make rules for their governance and regulation.95 Con-
gress' power to declare war is more than just a purely formal power to
"declare" war; it is the power to "initiate" war.96 This explicit and un-
ambiguous grant of power over the use of military force, coupled with
the absence of any similarly explicit and unambiguous grant to the Presi-
dent, strongly indicates that the Constitution gives to Congress, and only
to Congress, the power to authorize the use of military force which
amounts to war.
89. See generally King & Leavans, supra note 50, at 65-68 (the authors discuss at length
the three-tiered standard summarized infra notes 109-115 and in the accompanying text),
90. Id. at 62.
91. Id. at 59.
92. Id. at 64.
93. Id.; Power to Commit Forces, supra note 13, at 1777 ("The President is recognized as
possessing a wide variety of powers, the exercise of which does not constitute an infringement
on congressional power to initiate war despite the possibility that his acts may provoke another
country to resort to war.").
94. King & Leavans, supra note 50, at 59.
95. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11-16.
96. Power to Commit Forces, supra note 13, at 1774.
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Furthermore, the language of the Constitution indicates that Con-
gress controls not only the declaration of an all-out war, but more limited
uses of military force as well: Congress has the power to "grant Letters
of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land
and Water."97 Thus, Professor Leonard G. Ratner of the University of
Southern California Law Center has concluded that "[t]he specification
of war as an area of congressional competence indicates legislative pre-
eminence in the formulation of war-peace policy. . ... 98
The Framers of the Constitution also appear to have intended that
Congress have the primary role in controlling the use of force. During
the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the original draft of the Constitu-
tion gave Congress the power to "make" war. The Convention voted to
substitute "declare" for "make" in order to give the President the power
to repel sudden attacks.9 9 This vote could lead to the inference that,
prior to the substitution of this word, the President did not even have the
power to repel sudden attacks. Therefore, the Framers arguably may
have intended Congress to have control over all uses of military force
except the use of military force to repel sudden attacks. There is also
evidence that the Framers felt strongly that war was not something into
which the nation should rush. For example, James Mason of Virginia
"was for clogging rather than facilitating war." 1 Finally, the Framers
intended to "vest the power to embark on war in the body most broadly
representative of the people."' 01 Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts stated
that he "never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the
Executive alone to declare war."'1
0 2
The courts generally have upheld the view that Congress has the
exclusive power to declare war and at least some control over other uses
of military force.103 In Talbot v. Seeman, Chief Justice John Marshall
declared:
The whole powers of war being, by the Constitution of the United
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. See Leonard G. Ratner, The Coordinated Warmaking
Power-Legislative, Executive and Judicial Roles, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 461,465 (1971) ("The
constitutional purpose underlying the power to declare war implies preeminent congressional
authority over all military action." (emphasis added)).
98. Ratner, supra note 96, at 463.
99. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) [hereinafter THE RECORDS] (Roger Sherman of Connecticut stated: "The Executive
should be able to repel and not to commence war.").
100. Id. at 319.
101. Power to Commit Forces, supra note 13, at 1773.
102. THE RECORDS, supra note 99, at 318.
103. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801).
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States, vested in Congress, the acts cf that body alone can be resorted
to as our guides in this inquiry. It is not denied, nor in the course of
the argument has it been denied, that Congress may authorize general
hostilities, in which case the general laws of war apply to our situation;
or partial war, in which case the laws of war, so far as they actually
apply to our situation, must be noticed. 1°4
Thus, Marshall recognized Congress' constitutional control over not only
war, but also "partial war." In the Prize Cases decision, Justice Grier
wrote for the majority of the Supreme Court that: "1The President] has
no power to initiate or declare war against a foreign nation .... "105
In the last few decades, the courts have reaffirmed the view that the
President's power is limited. The Second Circuit stated during the Viet-
nam War that:
[T]he power to commit American military forces under various sets of
circumstances is shared by Congress and the executive. History makes
clear that the congressional power 'to declare War' conferred by Arti-
cle I, Section 8, of the Constitution was intended as an explicit restric-
tion upon the power of the Executive to initiate war on his own
prerogative which was enjoyed by the British sovereign. 106
Last year, as a result of President Bush's assertion that he can initiate
war without congressional authorization, the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia declared: "[I]f the War Clause is to have its normal
meaning, it excludes from the power to declare war all branches other
than the Congress."'0 7
6 Therefore, although the Constitution vests in the President vast
powers, through the aggregate of which the President has concurrent au-
thority with Congress over the use of military force under some circum-
stances, the Constitution vests the power to initiate war only in Congress.
The plain meaning of the text of the Constitution, the comments and
history surrounding its drafting, and the courts' interpretation of it all
affirm this conclusion.
D. The President's Power to Initiate Military Action Not Amounting
to War
As shown above, the use of military force to implement Security
Council Resolution 678 amounted to war under the Constitution, and
only Congress could authorize such use. Assuming that the use of mili-
104. Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
105. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862).
106. Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 305 (2d Cir. 1970).
107. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1144 n.5 (1990).
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tary force to implement Security Council Resolution 678 threatened war
but did not amount to war, the President and Congress had concurrent
power. In such a case the Constitution provides no clear answer as to
whether the President may use military force without congressional au-
thorization. 08 Justice Jackson argued convincingly in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer'o that any express or implied opposition by Con-
gress makes the President's constitutional authority extremely doubtful.
Because Congress expressly precluded such actions in the War Powers
Resolution, the President probably had no constitutional authority to use
force to implement Resolution 678 even if such use merely threatened
war or was a "police action."
In his classic analytical framework set forth in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Jackson argued that: "Presidential powers
are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunc-
tion with those of Congress." 110 Accordingly, he divided Presidential
actions into three categories. The President's power to take the particu-
lar action depends upon the category into which the action falls.
First, the President's power is at its maximum when he "acts pursu-
ant to an express or implied authorization of Congress" because his au-
thority "includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that
Congress can delegate." '111 Second, the President's power is uncertain
when he acts "in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority" because "he can only rely upon his own independent pow-
ers."' 2 There exists, however, "a zone of twilight" in which the Presi-
dent and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which the
distribution of authority is uncertain.1 ' In this zone, "congressional in-
ertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential re-
sponsibility. . .. [A]ny actual test of power is likely to depend on the
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on
abstract theories of law."' 14 Finally, the President's power is "at its low-
est ebb" when he "takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress" because he has only "his own constitutional
108. King & Leavans, supra note 50, at 64.
109. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
110. Id at 635.
111. Id
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powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter."11."
In this situation, the courts can uphold exclusive Presidential control
only by precluding Congress from acting on the matter. Therefore, the
courts should scrutinize the President's claim with caution in order to
avoid upsetting "the equilibrium established by our constitutional
system."1
16
Congress expressed or, at the very least, implied its opposition to the
use of military force by the President through the War Powers Resolu-
tion of 1973.117 The War Powers Resolution, enacted over President
Nixon's veto on November 7, 1973, requires the President to consult
with Congress "in every possible instance" before introducing military
forces into a situation of actual or imminent hostilities.' 18 It also re-
quires the President to report to Congress within 48 hours after sending
military forces into a situation of actual or imminent hostilities, or into a
foreign nation when equipped for combat (except when such forces are
only for supply, replacement, repair, or training), or into a foreign nation
in numbers which substantially enlarge United States combat forces al-
ready there.119 The President must terminate any use of such military
forces within 60 days after the report is submitted or required to be sub-
mitted (though he may extend this period by 30 days if he feels that the
military forces cannot be withdrawn safely within the 60-day limit) un-
less Congress declares war, enacts specific legislation, extends the 60-day
period, or is unable to meet because of an armed attack. Congress may
terminate the use of military forces at any time by concurrent resolu-
tion. 12 0 Although there is some controversy over the matter, the Resolu-
tion's main provisions are "plainly constitutional."12 '
The War Powers Resolution applied to the military deployments in
the Persian Gulf. The President sent military forces into a situation of
actual or imminent hostilities, into a foreign nation when equipped for
combat, and into a foreign nation in numbers which "substantially en-
larged United States combat forces there." Yet, the President refused to
acknowledge that the Resolution controlled his actions in any way.1
22
115. Id.
116. Id. at 638.
117. The War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982)) [hereinafter War Powers Resolution].
118. Id § 3, 87 Stat. 555.
119. Id § 4, 87 Stat. 555-56.
120. Id. § 5, 87 Stat. 556-57.
121. John H. Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 1379, 1386 (1988).
122. Fred Strasser, Debate Grows on Gulf Presence, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 8, 1990, at 3.
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Under Justice Jackson's standard then, the President took measures in-
compatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress. Therefore,
the President's constitutional authority to use force was "at its lowest
ebb."12
3
The War Powers Resolution raises another issue. Because section 5
allows the President up to 90 days to use military force without congres-
sional authorization,124 some commentators have argued that the Presi-
dent had at least implicit congressional authorization to use military
force, perhaps even to prosecute hostilities amounting to a war, on his
own authority for up to 90 days. 125 If the President had wanted the ben-
efit of this grace period, he had to recognize the constitutionality of the
Resolution and prepare to comply fully with its provisions, including im-
mediately removing military forces from a conflict or zone of potential
conflict if Congress had so directed or the 90-day period had expired.
Since President Bush refused to recognize or formally comply with the
War Powers Resolution,126 he could not argue that he could have used
military force for up to 90 days without congressional authorization.
IV. THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND
DELEGATION OF THE WAR POWER
Some commentators have argued that because the Senate ratified the
United Nations Charter and the full Congress passed the United Nations
Participation Act, Congress in effect delegated the power to declare war
to the President through the treaty-making process. Under this theory,
the President may exercise this power at his discretion. Thus, the Presi-
dent could have implemented Security Council Resolution 678 without
congressional authorization. This argument raises a number of ques-
tions. First, does the Constitution permit Congress to delegate the
123. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-638 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); see also Comment, The War Powers Resolution: Statutory Limitation on the Cor-
mander-in-Chief, 11 HARv. J. ON LEG s. 181, 200-01 (1974). "[T]he very fact that Congress
passed the War Powers Resolution switches the standards by which a presidential action is to
be judged from the second to the third division of Justice Jackson's tripartite universe of presi-
dential power." id; but cf King & LeaVans, supra note 50, at 66. The authors state that,
when the President uses military force not amounting to war without congressional authoriza-
tion, he is acting "within Justice Jackson's 'twilight' area of concurrent authority, and absent
congressional opposition, is constitutionally entitled to take the action." Id. Apparently the
authors did not believe that the War Powers Resolution constituted either congressional oppo-
sition or authorization for the use of military force not amounting to war.
124. War Powers Resolution, supra note 117, § 5(b), 87 Stat. 556-57.
125. Ellen Collier, The War Powers Resolution: Fifteen Years of Evperience, Cong. Res.
Service No. 88-529 F (1988).
126. Strasser, supra note 122.
1991]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
power to declare war? If so, does the Constitution permit the Senate
alone to delegate this power by ratifying a treaty? Third, did Congress in
fact delegate the power to declare war to the President through the
United Nations Charter and the United Nations Participation Act?
The question of whether Congress can delegate its power to declare
war is fraught with controversy. The Supreme Court has declared that
"Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President . ... 127
At the same time, however, the Court has allowed Congress to delegate
certain portions of legislative power so long as Congress retains the es-
sentials of the legislative function or "the determination of the legislative
policy and its formation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule
of conduct .... ""8 Further, the court found that these "essentials are
preserved when Congress has specified the basic conditions of fact upon
whose existence or occurrence, ascertained from relevant data by a desig-
nated administrative agency, it directs that its statutory command shall
be effective." '129
The Supreme Court eroded the general rule against Congress' dele-
gation of the legislative power even more in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Co.,13 where it held that the restraints on such delegation
do not apply to external affairs. A number of commentators have criti-
cized the rationale of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co.,"' but
its conclusion appears to be accepted, at least in practice.
1 32
One caveat, however, is that a treaty cannot override the Constitu-
127. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692-93 (1890).
128. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944).
129. Id at 424-25.
130. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
131. See Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's
Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946); FRANcis WORMUTH & EDWIN FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE
DoG OF WAR 206-211 (1986).
132. EDWARD CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITITION 153-54 (1947) [hereinafter
TOTAL WAR]. Corwin states that:
[T]he doctrine that Congress cannot delegate its powers in order to exercise them
more efficiently is today a pretty frail reliance even in the field or domestic legislation,
while in the realm of foreign relations it seems to have been dismissed by the Court
altogether in recent cases. The truth is that in the latter field the 'cognate powers' of
the two departments ... are so broad, so indefinite, so overlapping, that the Court
could not disentangle them if it wished to, which, of course, it would be necessary for
it to do if it were to attempt to say whether Congress had or had not delegated power
in a particular instance. And it is also true that Congress has from the beginning
repeatedly delegated powers to the President to assist him in carrying out a foreign
policy, whether his own or Congress'.
Id. (emphasis in the original). See also David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the
Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1265 (1985) ("Where the Constitution gives
the Executive independent powers in Article II, as it does over war and foreign affairs, action
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tion 33 and any delegation by Congress of the war power without any
conditions or restraints whatsoever, almost certainly would be unconsti-
tutional. In practice, however, delegation by treaty would include some
sort of conditions, restraints, or policy guidelines, either express or im-
plied from the treaty as a whole, and thus probably would be
constitutional.
Assuming that Congress can delegate the power to declare war,
however, the next question is whether it can do so solely through the
treaty-making process alone. Can the Senate alone delegate the power to
declare war to the President? Since the Constitution vests the power to
declare war in the full Congress, the Senate alone cannot delegate the
power without the consent of the House.1 34 The Framers specifically re-
jected giving the Senate the power to declare war.1 35 Therefore, the Sen-
ate should not be able, in effect, to declare war through its treaty-making
power and thwart the Framers intent. Professor Corwin stated: "Today
it is the overwhelming verdict of practice, at least, under the Constitu-
tion, that no treaty provision which deals with subject-matter falling to
the jurisdiction of Congress by virtue of its enumerated powers can have
the force of the 'law of the land' until Congress has adopted legislation to
give it that effect." 136 Since the power to declare war is an enumerated
power, a treaty provision delegating this power to the President is not
law until the entire Congress has adopted legislation delegating this
power.
Finally, the question remains whether Congress in fact did delegate
the power to declare war to the President through the United Nations
Charter and the United Nations Participation Act.137 Section 287d of
the United Nations Participation Act authorizes the President to negoti-
ate special agreements with the Security Council in accordance with Ar-
ticle 43. These agreements are subject to the "approval of the Congress
by appropriate Act or joint resolution."1 38 Once Congress has approved
the special agreements, however, the President does not "require the au-
thorization of the Congress to make available to the Security Council on
by Congress authorizing their use cannot be an improper delegation of legislative powers.')
(emphasis in the original).
133. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 15-19 (1957); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
134. L. Velvel, The War in Viet Nam: Unconstitutional, Justiciable. and Jurisdictionally
Attackable, in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 657 (R. Falk ed., 1969).
135. THE RECORDS, supra note 99, at 318.
136. TOTAL WAR, supra note 132, at 153.
137. United Nations Charter, supra note 11; United Nations Participation Act of 1945,
supra note 12.
138. United Nations Participation Act of 1945, supra note 12, 59 Stat. 621, § 6.
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its call in order to take action under Article 42" the armed forces, facili-
ties, or assistance provided for by the special agreements.1 39 Finally, Sec-
tion 287d provides that, except as authorized by special agreement,
"nothing herein contained shall be construed as an authorization to the
President by the Congress to make available to the Security Council for
such purpose armed forces, facilities, or assistance in addition to the
forces, facilities, and assistance provided for in such special agreement or
agreements."" 4 The Act does delegate the power to declare war to the
President, but only within the narrow confines of a special agreement
between the United States and the Security Council which must be inde-
pendently negotiated and approved by the full Congress. Since the
United States and the Security Council have not negotiated any such spe-
cial agreement, 141 the delegation of power is ineffective and the President
had no power to declare war under the U.N. Charter.
Section 8 of the War Powers Resolution further undermines the the-
ory that Congress delegated the power to declare war to the President.
Section 8 declares that the President should not infer any authority to
introduce military forces "into hostilities or into situations wherein in-
volvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances" from
"any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified." The President may only
introduce military forces into hostilities or into situations where involve-
ment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances where the
legislation implementing the treaty specifically authorizes such authority
and states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization
within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution.1 42 Congress could
not have made a more unequivocal statement of its position on the mat-
ter. Moreover, since it concerns a delegation of an enumerated power of
Congress, this statement is binding upon the President.
V. CONCLUSION
President Bush had no power under the Constitution to use military
force to implement Security Council Resolution 678 without authoriza-
tion from Congress. First, the theory that the President's duty to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed required him to enforce an obli-
gation of the United States fails because there was no such obligation
under Resolution 678. The Security Council merely authorized, but did
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Glennon, supra note 31.
142. The War Powers Resolution, § 8, 87 Stat. 558.
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not obligate, the United States to use all necessary means, not necessarily
military force, to implement Resolution 678. Further, there was no obli-
gation under the United Nations Charter because the Security Council
had no authority to obligate the United States to use military force unless
the United States has bound itself through a special agreement under
Article 43. The United States has never done so.
Second, the conflict in the Persian Gulf was a war within the mean-
ing of the Constitution. Therefore, since Congress, and only Congress,
has the power to declare war under the Constitution, the President could
not have used military force without congressional authorization. Even
assuming that the conflict in the Persian Gulf was not a war within the
meaning of the Constitution, however, the President probably did not
have the power, whether from the Commander in Chief clause or implied
from the aggregate of his powers, to order the use of military force to
implement Resolution 678 in direct contravention of the will of Congress
as expressed in the War Powers Resolution.
Finally, while it appears that Congress can delegate the power to
declare war under certain circumstances, the Senate alone cannot do so
through the treaty process. Instead, the full Congress must participate in
the delegation of an enumerated legislative power. Congress did delegate
the power to declare war to the President through the United Nations
Participation Act, but only where the President negotiated a special
agreement with the Security Council, the full Congress consented to such
agreement, and the President ratified it. Since the United States and the
Security Council have never executed a special agreement under Article
43, the President did not have the power to declare war in the Persian
Gulf.
The Constitution leaves much unsaid and ambiguous. For the past
two-hundred years, Presidents have exploited this ambiguity to increase
their control over the war power at the expense of Congress. In order to
prevent this accretion of power from upsetting the constitutional equilib-
rium, Congress, the press, and the American people should scrutinize
each new Presidential claim. The President's claim that he had the
power to use force to implement Resolution 678 cannot withstand such
scrutiny. If accepted, this claim would give the President a new and po-
tentially immense power wholly inconsistent with the Constitution. The
more the United Nations comes to play an active role and seeks to
"maintain international peace and security" through the Security Coun-
cil, the more opportunities the President will have to use force without
congressional authorization. Ironically, the rebirth of one venerated doc-
ument could undermine another venerated document.
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